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Smith v. Shaughnessy: Slippery Remainder Interests
and the Intersection of Gift and Estate Taxes
Anne-Marie Rhodes and Erica E. Lord*
DOUBLE TAXATION WITHOUT LEGISLATION?
In 1935, H.W. Smith both celebrated his seventieth birthday and
suffered the loss of his first wife, Mina Smith.1 Shortly thereafter, he
married Gladys Morrow Diefendorf, who was nearly thirty years his junior.2 Mr. Smith’s estate was significant and included substantial interests in his family’s business, L.C. Smith & Corona Typewriters, Inc.
(“Smith-Corona”).3 Mr. Smith established an irrevocable trust for his
wife, naming Syracuse Trust Company as trustee. He funded it with
3,000 shares of convertible preferred stock in Smith-Corona valued at
approximately $570,000.4 The trust required the income be paid to
Gladys during her lifetime, and upon her death, the balance would revert to the grantor, if living, otherwise to Gladys’s legatees or distributees under New York law.5 On his 1937 gift tax return, Mr. Smith
reported a taxable transfer to the trust of the full value of the stock and
paid the gift tax. He subsequently filed a claim for refund arguing that
he had not made a completed gift of the entire property transferred to
the trust.6
The district court agreed with the taxpayer, finding that the amount
of the gift was the value of the life estate transferred to Gladys only, and
that no part of the remainder was subject to gift tax.7 The Second Circuit reversed, agreeing with the government that the remainder was subject to gift tax because Mr. Smith had sufficiently parted with control
* Anne-Marie Rhodes is a Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School
of Law and an ACTEC Academic Fellow. Erica E. Lord is a Senior Vice President and
Senior Legal Counsel at The Northern Trust Company.
1 Smith Corona: Turning Adversity into Innovation and Creating Ongoing Success The Never-Give-Up Journey of Smith Corona, SMITH CORONA, at 4 (2012), http://www
.smithcorona.com/pdf/SmithCoronaFullHistory.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id. at 16.
4 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 40 F. Supp. 19, 20 (N.D. N.Y. 1941). The sum contributed
would equal approximately $9.5 million today.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 20-21.
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over the property, but for his reversion.8 Mr. Smith sought review by
the Supreme Court, claiming that the transferred interest could not be
subject to both gift tax and estate tax without express statutory authority, which did not exist.9 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
value of the entire transfer, less the reversion, was subject to gift tax.10
Smith’s arrival at the Supreme Court followed a procession of cases
tackling the interpretation of the newly-enacted gift tax, the first version
of which was enacted in 1924 and repealed in 1926.11 In an attempt to
combat avoidance of income and estate taxes, as well as to raise revenue, the gift tax was revived, overhauled and reinstated by the Revenue
Act of 1932.12 Section 501(b) of the Revenue Act (precursor to today’s
Code13 section 2511) imposed a tax on every transfer of property by gift,
“whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real
or personal, tangible or intangible.”14 It was designed to be construed
in “the broadest and most comprehensive sense” to reach “every species
of right or interest protected by law and having an exchangeable
value.”15 The accompanying Treasury Regulation issued in 1936 provided that the gift is complete and subject to the tax when the “donor
has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to
cause the beneficial title to be revested in himself.”16
Although estate planning attorneys are now well-acquainted with
that language and the concept of completed gifts, both the Service and
courts struggled to define the boundaries of the gift tax during the decade following its reenactment.17 In particular, the Supreme Court grappled with the definition of a completed gift of property to a trust when
8

Smith v. Shaughnessy, 128 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1942).
Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, 11-12, Smith v. Shaughnessy, 128 F.2d 742 (2d Cir.
1942) (No. 429), 1943 WL 54689 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
10 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943).
11 H.R. Rep. No. 72-708, at 28 (1924); see David Joulfaian, The Federal Gift Tax:
History, Law, and Economics, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS
PAPER 100 (Nov. 2007).
12 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169 (1932); Joulfaian, supra note 11, at 1;
see Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9
FLA. TAX REV. 875, 884 (2010).
13 All references to the “Code” herein refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
14 Smith, 318 U.S. at 177 (citing Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501(b), 506, 47
Stat. 169, 245, 248).
15 S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 39 (1939).
16 Treas. Reg. § 85.3 (1936).
17 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 282 (1933) (right to revoke gift); Sanford v.
Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1939) (right to add beneficiaries); Rasquin v. Humphreys,
308 U.S. 54, 56 (1939) (power of revocation); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187
(1943) (reversion).
9
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the donor retained “strings” that implicated the estate tax.18 Smith
presented the Court with the opportunity to rethink its previous interpretations of the gift tax as applied to retained interests in trusts, specifically, remainder interests following a donor’s reversionary interest.19
REFINING SANFORD
At the Supreme Court, Mr. Smith advanced two arguments. First,
he argued that the Court’s earlier decision in Sanford v. Commissioner
intimated that the gift tax and the estate tax were mutually exclusive,
and therefore, the contingent remainder could not be subject to gift tax
now and estate tax later.20 Second, he argued that, though the value of
his reversionary interest was determinable, the remainder interest was
impossible to value and could not be subject to gift tax.21
Sanford had examined the applicability of the gift tax to a trust over
which the donor retained the right to add beneficiaries other than himself.22 That case considered whether a gift was complete when the property was transferred or when the donor relinquished the power to add
beneficiaries.23 In Sanford, the Court commented the gift tax statute
must be read “in the light of the closely related provisions of the revenue laws taxing transfers at death.”24 In doing so, the Sanford Court
announced,
[A] transfer of property upon trust, with power reserved to the
donor either to revoke it and recapture the trust property or to
modify its terms so as to designate new beneficiaries other than
himself is incomplete, and becomes complete so as to subject
the transfer to death taxes only on relinquishment of the power
at death.25
18 Sanford, 308 U.S. at 42 (noting contrary I.R.S. positions taken in Sanford and its
companion case, Rasquin). See F. Philip Manns, Jr., New Reasons to Remember the Estate Taxation of Reversions, 44 R. PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 323, 328 (2009) (citing Spiegel’s
Estate v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Comm’r v. Church’s Estate, 335 U.S. 632, 634
(1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 110 (1940); Helvering v. St. Louis Union Tr.
Co., 296 U.S. 39, 40 (1935); Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1931); May v.
Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 242 (1930); Reinecke v. N. Tr. Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Shukert v.
Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 547 (1927)).
19 Sanford, 308 U.S. at 40-41.
20 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 178 (1943).
21 Id. at 180.
22 Sanford, 308 U.S. at 41-42.
23 Id. at 41.
24 Id. at 42.
25 Id. at 43-44.
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The Court stated the question was to be resolved in conformity with
“the course of judicial decision applicable to a unified scheme of taxation of gifts whether made inter vivos or at death.”26
In reliance on this language in Sanford, Mr. Smith contended his
reversionary interest was terminable only upon death; therefore, the
transfer of the contingent remainder following his death was currently
incomplete and could not be subject to gift tax.27 Mr. Smith reasoned,
as in Sanford, death or a further relinquishment of the reserved right
was necessary before he could fully part with the corpus, and until his
death “the possession and enjoyment of the remainder interests are suspended.”28 Mr. Smith argued, as in Sanford, the relinquishment of the
interest at his death would subject the value of the trust’s corpus to estate tax.29
The Court thought Mr. Smith’s argument “misunderstands our position in the Sanford case.”30 Referring to its analysis in Hallock,31 Sanford 3 2 and Guggenheim, 3 3 the Supreme Court affirmed the
determination that the remainder had been completely transferred, but
for the value of Mr. Smith’s reversion, since he retained “neither the
form nor the substance of control” over the property and would never
regain control unless he outlived his wife.34 The subsequent taxation of
the property in Mr. Smith’s estate under the precursor to section 2037
did not change the analysis that a completed gift occurred. The Court
expressly commented that the gift and estate taxes are not always mutually exclusive, but instead, supplement one another.35 Dispelling Mr.
Smith’s claim of double taxation, the Court pointed to the credit for
prior gift taxes paid as evidence of Congress’s intent to integrate the two
taxes, likening the gift tax to “a form of down-payment on the estate
tax.”36
The Court’s holding and its commentary on the interrelationship
between the gift and estate taxes illustrates key differences between the
taxes. From a gift tax standpoint, the Court’s holding is consistent with
the fundamental premise of the gift tax – that Mr. Smith made a com26

Id. at 48.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 9, at 5-6; see Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a),
47 Stat. 169, 279 (1932) (inclusion of future interests in gross estate).
28 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 9, at 8.
29 Id. at 7; see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 133 (1940).
30 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943).
31 Hallock, 309 U.S. at 125.
32 Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
33 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
34 Smith, 318 U.S. at 181.
35 Id. at 179.
36 Id.
27
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pleted gift of the contingent remainder when he effectively and completely relinquished dominion and control over it. From an estate tax
standpoint, unless the reversion is relinquished during life, it is terminable only by predeceasing the life tenant, and therefore, reached by the
estate tax as an interest taking effect in possession or enjoyment only at
or after death.
Mr. Smith’s second argument concerned valuation. He claimed the
remainder following his reversion was so uncertain “that no realistic
value can be placed on the contingent remainder and that it therefore
should not be classed as a gift.”37 The Court distinguished the issue of
valuation from the initial determination of whether a completed gift had
been made. Noting that “ingenious trust instruments” cannot be used to
defeat a tax, the Court acknowledged, “Even though these concepts of
property and value may be slippery and elusive they can not escape taxation so long as they are used in the world of business.”38

SMITH’S LEGACY
Smith may seem arcane and insignificant today, for reversions in
gift trusts are rare. The importance of Smith lies in its analysis not its
result. The Court’s two pronouncements – (i) the estate and gift taxes
are not mutually exclusive, and (ii) valuation difficulty does not negate a
gift – are accepted tenets in estate and gift tax today. In addition, by
framing the question of a gift in the context of control, and not on “ingenious trust instruments,”39 the Court unequivocally aligned its transfer
tax jurisprudence on the side of substance over form. Because some of
its precedents seemed to elevate “the niceties of the art of conveyancing,” the Court’s particular emphasis on control was critical.40
Congress has continued to refine the estate and gift tax system
throughout the seventy years following Smith, yet its principles and
analysis hold true today. Indeed, an argument can be made that some
revisions may have been prompted or foreshadowed in part by Smith.
Congress revised the estate tax in 1949 to deal specifically with reversions, and further refined the law with the addition of section 2037 in
1954. In writing that “Congress has provided as its plan for integrating
37

Id. at 180.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 181; see Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 234 (1931) (contingent remainder). But cf. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Tr. Co., 296 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1935) (the trust
instrument, and not the death, was the generating source of title).
38
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the estate and gift taxes” the provision of the credit for gift taxes paid,
the Court may have sown the seeds for the fuller integration of those
taxes in 1976.41

41

Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943).

